It’s not about Taiwan, stupid. It’s about “Tianxia”

Xi2023

(By Kenneth Fan. Original Post on TaiwanNews 2023-10-14)

Frankly, I’m tired of hearing experts debate whether or how soon China might attack Taiwan, or the issue of whether Taiwan is worth defending.

I’m bored of these discussions, not because they aren’t significant. Rather, it’s because the mindset behind many who discuss these topics severely underestimates the political and economic predicaments China currently faces.

Many commentators also short-change the ambitions of Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) and are unaware of the unique cultural, structural aspects of the CCP regime which influence their course of action when threatened, such as China is today.

Just as plain as Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” I must emphasize to all experts discussing the China-Taiwan conflict, “It’s not about Taiwan, stupid. It is about Tianxia (天下).”

In a historical sense, “Tianxia” is a Chinese term that every Chinese person understood throughout different dynasties, even down to the peasants who didn’t have the privilege of primary schooling. The term means “the entire world that one can conceive,” or literally “All under Heaven” (tian (天) means sky or heaven, and xia (下) means under).

Allow me to tell a true story that might shock some readers. Anyway, it shocked me, a native Mandarin speaker and a 20-plus-year China affairs veteran. Back in the summer of 2013, after some 20 years mingling with people of all sectors of society and levels of political power in China, I decided to come home to retire in Taiwan. A middle-aged advisor for the then newly elevated CCP Chairman Xi, came to Taipei and met with me through the introduction of a contact whom I knew well in China.

The purpose of the visit: Xi privately revealed his intention of keeping his throne for at least 20 years. Since Xi didn’t trust the old guards around him, he secretly gathered a group of about 100 young advisors to “construct a grand theory” to buttress his endeavor. The group did come up with a grand theory with only one missing link – how does one to place Taiwan’s experience, especially its one-person-one-vote system, into the grand theory? This particular gentleman decided to visit Taiwan to find an answer to that missing-link question, and asked our mutual acquaintance to identify someone who deeply understands both China and Taiwan. And I fit the bill.

As a courtesy, I drove him to a scenic location nearby Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan. We talked on the way. All of a sudden, the man shouted, “Stop the car! We can’t have a decent discussion while driving!” So, I parked the car at a safe corner on the highway, expecting to rest for a few minutes. Then he started talking and asking questions. The roadside discussion lasted 6 hours.

He talked about his observations in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and several Southeast Asian countries. He wanted to know what made Taiwan so different. Approaching the end of the discussion, I praised him for his international exposure, and he responded by saying “For someone who has never left China, I’m hardly international.” Shocked, I questioned him whether he was lying to me about all those observations about Japan, Korea, Singapore, and other Asian countries. He snapped, and with a scornful look, made a statement that I will never forgot, “I didn’t leave China, those places are all domestic!”

Later, he asked me to keep the content of the conversation private. I agreed, and considered that such a conception might be just his personal idiosyncratic worldview and not a disclosure of Xi’s own worldview. It was not until 2015, after observing Xi very closely, that I became convinced that it was indeed a conception also shared by Xi. The world needs to know about this outlook of Xi’s, I thought. So, I pondered Xi’s options given such a worldview, and published a book titled “Chatting with Xi Jinping About Taiwan and China.”

To this day, as far as I am aware, the book is likely the first document that disclosed Xi’s intentions for his anticipated 20-year reign. Notably, his actions while in power and the evolution of his leadership matched almost exactly what was projected in the book. My encounter with the mysterious Xi advisor was also disclosed in later articles I published.

So, it must be emphasized that in Xi’s mindset, it was never about Taiwan, it is always about Tianxia. More pointedly, Xi conceives the scope of Tianxia in the same manner as ancient emperors, while perceiving himself as heir apparent to China’s dynastic legacy. Please note, in this regard, Xi is even less “international” than Mao. The scope of Mao’s mindset was bounded to the “Communist International.” Mao was ambitious in the manner of Stalin or Lenin, while Xi’s imaginative capacity is way beyond that.

Remember how Xi turned reefs into military bases in the South China Sea? Remember One-Belt, One-Road? I truly do not know who is more naive, the Americans or the Europeans. But I am pretty sure if one were to show this piece of writing to a Vietnamese reader, they would understand it better. As Western and Japanese corporations are “friend-shoring” their factories to Vietnam, they assume they have found a safer location for business that within China proper. Well, they may be wrong, because Vietnam is definitely part of Tianxia in Xi’s mind.

No matter how imaginative a Western scholar or politician may be, the modern West’s historical concept of international order is bound to the system of Westphalian sovereignty. The Westphalian Order is only 400 years old, while the concept of Tianxa as an imperial precept is at least 2,000 years old, and it precludes the notion of mutual sovereignty among states.

Now back to the starting point of this article. Taiwan may serve as the excuse to kickoff a military campaign to realize Xi’s Tianxia vision, and it would also serve as China’s scapegoat. But circumstances are changing; at this very moment, an international alliance is forming which is keenly concerned with the security of Taiwan. However, the flashpoint of military conflict with China could also shift to some other regional locations, say, the Philippines, Okinawa, or even a U.S. territory, such as Guam.

I humbly urge all China or CCP watchers to turn their attention to the historical conception of Tianxia. Coupling Tianxia and the philosophical concept of “Yin-Yang,” or dialectical maneuvering, any traditional game-theory-based analysis for political conflict or military simulation may fall short.

For example, Xi may be smart enough not to risk a direct nuclear confrontation with the U.S. and instead decide to find a middle ground to pursue his Tianxia vision. This might be accomplished by detonating a tactical nuclear warhead in the desert area of Australia. This would not be an unimaginable tactic for Xi, in my view. It would certainly disrupt the “pivot to Taiwan” thinking of military analysts and cause great confusion in the Western alliance.

Adding fuel to the fire, what if Putin exploded a tactical nuclear warhead in the wilderness of Ukraine around the same time?

It is a great mistake to equate Putin’s nationalism with Xi’s Tianxia ambition. Putin’s nationalism is at best a dream of empire, while the scope of Tianxia is beyond building an empire. The implications of Xi’s Tianxia vision are incredibly far-reaching and could have devastating consequences for the world. It is essential that the international community is aware of the potential threat posed by this ambition and takes steps to ensure that it is not realized.

The Westphalian sovereignty order is crucial to ensuring that the world remains safe and secure. As a contrast, in Xi’s own words, “All mankind needs a new order that surpasses and supplants the balance of power…A new world order is now under construction that will surpass and supplant the Westphalian System.” This is a direct quote from the official texts on “Xi Jinping Thought” (2018) and was found and quoted in congressional testimony by Mr. Matt Pottinger, Chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, China Program and a former deputy national security adviser in the Trump White House. Xi hasn’t been hiding his worldview; the naivety of the world has simply caused nations to ignore the danger.

It’s never only about Taiwan. It’s about Tianxia, and that includes you, the reader. It is essential that we all understand the implications of this vision and take steps to ensure that it is not realized. We must remain vigilant and take action to protect our world from the potential threat posed by Xi’s Tianxia impulse. So, let’s not to be stupid. We must protect Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty.

Please keep this in mind: The existence and survival of Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty is essential for curtailing Xi Jinping’s Tianxia dream. If unchecked, such a vision would be a nightmare for mankind.

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5019938

Letter to Editor: It’s not about Taiwan, stupid. It’s about Tianxia | Taiwan News | 2023-10-14 10:55:00

133

嚴辦「海鯤洩密案」,破除「疑台論」

Boat001

「海鯤號」雖然尚未完工,但帶出的洩密案,已經足以扮演台灣最強的國安武器。通過它,馬上就可以發出第一顆魚雷:徹底轟破敵人在國際上散播的「疑台論」。

中共兩手策略:疑美又疑台

這兩年來,台灣內部只察覺到中共認知戰中的一隻腳——散播「疑美論」,沒察覺的是認知戰的另一隻腳——「疑台論」。

「疑美論」這顆集束炸彈炸的是台灣,裡面裝的是什麼火藥,大家都已經清楚,那就是:散播「美國沒有協防台灣的能力及意願」之說法。相對的,「疑台論」這顆集束炸彈炸的是國際,裡面裝的白磷火藥就是:

1. 我們(中共)已經徹底滲透台灣社會,台灣的軍隊、媒體尤其是重災區;

2. 貴國向台灣提供的任何軍事機密、情報、設備,我們(中共)馬上就會得知,並令貴國得不償失。

若把過去一年的全球主要媒體攤在桌上,你可發現各國所有的主流媒體,包括紐約時報、華爾街日報、金融時報、日經新聞、朝鮮日報、海峽時報、CNN、BBC、澳洲60分鐘、半島日報⋯⋯無一未刊登過與「疑台論」相關的大幅報導。自媒體——更不用說了,大批點擊量過百萬的軍事、政治頻道,談到台海形勢時無不順帶提幾句「疑台論」。

台灣的「被滲透」、「口風不緊」、「隨意洩密」、「為利資敵」標籤,已經逐步的在友邦社會植入了種子、並且已經發芽!

這就是為什麼:沸沸騰騰的「海鯤號」洩密案的偵辦高度,未來幾個月內將被全球媒體視為「台灣究竟是不是一個扶不起的阿斗」之試紙快篩劑。台灣當局、社會,若草草了事、息事寧人、「適可而止」——那就等同於向世界自證「疑台論」是對的。

非告訴乃論處置國防洩密

但若台灣自己將此案件提升到國安最高層次,甚至以「非告訴乃論」的通案態度,主動偵辦此案中所有和洩密行為有關的破口、從重處置保密態度輕率之涉案人士,鉅細靡遺地將每一顆鬆掉的螺絲扭緊。那麼,這就是台灣的一次難得機會:向國際展示「國安大掃除」的決心和能力。

不如此做,他國將永遠擔心提供最新設備以及敏感情報給台灣,這將從根本上限制了台灣軍方備戰方案的彈性。

破除「疑台論」,乃一場國際認知戰。其對台灣國安之重要性,十倍於「海鯤號」本身。台灣,通過嚴辦「海鯤洩密案」,向「疑台論」射出第一顆魚雷吧!

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習近平、王滬寧強迫金馬獨立公投?

Marzu

台灣的總統大選正夯,習近平及王滬寧此時拋出一個自認為高明的認知作戰方案,殊不知此項針對金門和馬祖的「福建示範區」方案,將打開一個二戰之後國際上懸而未決的「潘朵拉盒子」,不但可能迫使金門、馬祖舉辦獨立公投,並為「台灣共和國」(或其他名稱)移除了最大的路障。

中華民國在金馬?

台灣之所以今天還「猶抱琵琶半遮面」的對外稱呼自己為「R.O.C.(Taiwan)」,就是因為:對於金門/馬祖這所有人(包括美國、中國、台灣)都承認屬於「中國China」的兩串島系, 台灣不但具有實質控制力,而且還對島上居民有著無法放下的歷史責任和感情。一旦習/王二人的「金廈/馬福平(馬祖、福州、平潭)」福建示範區取得成效,那就等於是逼迫金馬居民「三選一」:向世界宣佈與中華人民共和國統一,或者向世界宣佈與台灣統一,甚或,乾脆自己舉辦獨立公投。

若是一,那台灣就沒有必要再在自己的對外稱呼中包含「R.O.C.」這元素了。

若是二,同樣的也可去掉「R.O.C.」這英文,因為,中華民國的現行憲法中並沒有規定國家的外文稱呼,過去的「R.O.C.」僅僅是約定俗成,隨時可以把「中華民國」這四個方塊字翻譯為「ZhongHuaMinGuo」(或台語、客語、原住民語的拼音),就好像土耳其2022年國名由Turkey改為 Turkiye。也像印度2023年9月的G20峰會開始把對外名稱由「India」改為「Bharat」一樣。

若是三,就更有趣了。例如,如果金門通過國際認可的公投形式,決定自己獨立,成立「金門共和國」,對外稱R.O.Kinmen 或老名R.O.Quemoi,台灣可以率先予以承認。金門共和國的民選總統也可以詢問對岸的廈門島居民要不要也通過公投獨立成立「廈門共和國」,和金門共和國組成鬆散邦聯。接下來,諸如香港島啦,上海浦東崇明島啦,海南島啦,山東半島啦,都可以如法泡製。世界及國際不見得不樂見。反正,我是樂見的。

住民自決誰能擋?

對以上的一、二、三種進展,台灣島及澎湖島的居民必須以平常心公正待之。住民自決,乃聯合國精神及國際法理的最根本元素。連俄國的普丁索要烏克蘭土地時,都得打著「住民自決」的旗幟

金馬不是南海島礁,上面是有住人的。依我看,不要繞著彎子搞什麼示範區,直接一步到位舉辦符合國際法理的公投最乾脆,好好給沒有投票經驗的中華人民共和國公民一次觀摩機會。

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1

習近平最怕的是湯姆克魯斯

湯姆克魯斯有兩個人設,一個是「捍衛戰士」(Top Gun)中的孤狼獨行俠 Maverick,另一個就是「不可能的任務」中的那個消滅敵手、使命必達的伊森杭特(Ethan Hunt)。

習近平不怕Maverick,他知道那是好萊塢、是漫畫書。但是他怕伊森,因為那就是過去十年他自己天天在幹的事、中國廿四史記載中發生在每個皇朝的事。

天威難測只能騙新人

歷史上想當開國之君的人,豈有不清除知己親信,換批新鮮奴才的?舊人雖然知根知底好用,但也並不那麼畏君威,畢竟默契是需要兩個巴掌的。要天威難測,還必須是新提拔的。

換奴才,最好還得是能幹的奴才,乃一件曠日費時的工作。這不是一個靜態的過程,奴才也都是有自己打算的。在沒有制度下,奴才之間的權力角色置換是一門不輸於管理馬戲團的藝術。連毛澤東,都動員了七八場大運動以及花了30年,尚且功敗垂成。前段人生靠裝孫子、後段人生才步入權場、現已年過70的習近平有希望通過重組奴才班子立下不世之開國之業嗎?

習近平通過黨內政變取得第三任期後,清除異己的頻率已經到了「屁股還沒做熱就必須清掉」的喪心病狂地步了。說句笑話:他清除異己經到了不知道剩下還可換的人是否也是異己的地步了。

習近平直接指揮的系統內有不滿派系嗎?有聽命於不滿份子的「伊森杭特」嗎?這是用常識都可以回答的。連普丁都還有個瓦格納普里格津呢。普里格津揮兵莫斯科時,普丁的奴才們一根手指都沒動。

打台海不如打中南海

十年前我所斷言的「世界上沒有台灣問題、只有台海議題」,而今已然完全成形。當下,響應美國的日本、韓國、越南、菲律賓、印度、澳洲、英、法、德,已經將印度洋、麻六甲海峽、南海、巴士海峽、台灣海峽、宮古海峽、渤海灣串連成一道海上長城,圍堵來自台灣海峽北邊的「塞外蠻族」。整體態勢倒不是防止蠻族「出海」,而是確保他出了海就回不去。

大態勢下,我相信所有的解放軍將領都已經明白兩個道理:

1. 打台海不如打中南海;

2. 即使打台海,也輪不到你習近平來取其功。

習近平的現狀是:

1. 不敢調動部隊,怕出現普里戈津;

2. 在中國境內不敢坐飛機,怕被雷達鎖定(反倒是在國外飛行條件更安全,因此由南非返國只能在新疆邊界落地);

3. 必須隨時坐鎮家中,不能離開中國;

4. 居處不定,過去僅在北京地區狡兔三窟,現在藏身整個西北區域;

5. 所到之處,連途徑車道的地下水井蓋都得鎖死。

看來在習近平眼中,天下沒有不可能的任務。這些,都是湯姆克魯斯惹的禍。

中國能吃草三年嗎?

美國前財長亨利鮑爾森,在他的與中國打交道20年的自傳中,對當年交手的朱鎔基和王岐山讚譽有加。書中他提到,王岐山有一次對他說,我們中國人只需要吃草就可以活三年,你們美國人吃草可以活多久?這是王岐山在威脅美國政府,你們美國人省省吧,別企圖掐我們中國人的脖子,先死的一定是美國。

解放軍需不需要糧食?

這故事不稀奇,30年前我就聽過。當時說的是中國總理周恩來招待1959年訪問北京的的蘇聯領導人赫魯曉夫吃晚飯,餐席間的菜色寒酸無比。用完餐後,周恩來問赫魯曉夫口味如何?赫魯曉夫說很難吃。周恩來告知:你今天晚上吃的東西全部都是我們解放軍兄弟用手從中蘇邊界土地裡挖出的蟲子和樹根,『我們的解放軍不需要帶糧食,就吃這樣的東西也可以打仗,你們蘇聯軍人呢』?

世界上很多國家都相信,中國人和越南人一樣吃苦耐勞,對痛苦的耐受力極為強大。台灣人當中,我估計到現在為止,至少還有2/3的人相信,中國人是一個逆來順受;可以忍受無限壓榨的民族,因此台灣人相信,共產黨可以無限統治中國下去。

作為一般性的判斷,以我在中國生活了20年的經驗,我是大致上同意這看法的,一直到2022年為止。2022年發生了什麼事?難道中國人的民族性在一年內就天翻地轉了嗎?不是的。造成我改變看法的兩個因素,一個是大數據,另一個是百年不遇的社會現象。

大數據就是:到了2022年,中國60%的人口已經住進了樓房。這件事與所謂的「城市化」沒有直接關係;現代意義的「城市化」,指的是一種生活基礎設施環境,諸如公共交通、公共教育、醫療、生存物資流轉(如超市、物流)等等。而在2022年的中國,只不過是60%的人口「住進了樓房」,而其中能夠享受城市公共資源的比例極小。

2022年的全國「封城」以及城市中「封區」,證明了即使過去的中國人「吃草也可以活三年」,今天的中國人吃草絕對活不了三個月。請聽清楚了:關鍵不在於「吃草」能不能活,而是在「草」能不能配送至小區內的樓房。

上海市封城三個月,許多人病死,並非沒醫院,而因無公共交通前往醫院;許多人餓死,並非上海缺糧,而是菜爛在郊區送不進小區,整個城市經濟停擺、人員失業,因為不能流動。一句話:現代經濟靠人流、物流、金流、信息流;流動性沒了,人命的基礎就沒了,這是一個系統性的問題,不是一個是否能吃苦耐勞的問題。王岐山,誤以為今天的中國還是周恩來時代的中國;西方人,沒看到中國的系統性問題,還用耐勞性、服從性看中國社會。

中國人做牛做馬還能吃草?

習近平一度想恢復文革時期的「全國供銷社制度」,以取代現代流動性。再來,旁邊的古裝策士告訴他,只要人民幣「徹底數位化」了,市場金流以及經濟活動控制的目標就可達成了。習近平恐怕真的相信:只要每個人的資產都可經由口袋裡的手機加以控制,中國就可隨時指揮金流而「舉全國之力辦大事」了。他現在正在試驗的一切「戰時經濟管理」辦法,恐怕就是這種信仰的體現。

只要把每一分資源控制起來,吃草也能活三年!當習近平發現這是一個笑話的時候,一切就都晚了。到時中國經濟停擺所產生的內部匱乏,應該會遠遠超過毛澤東的文革時期。這道理前面已經敘述,因為文革只是一場中國關起門來的災難,而接下來的中國經濟將是一場系統性的世界災難,其外溢效應是所有周邊國家都承擔不起的。

麻煩哪位就順便告訴習近平:今天的中國,吃草只能活三個月了。

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